000			01257nam a22001817a 4500
008			190323b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a0304-405X
245			_aBid anticipation, information revelation, and merger gains / by Wenyu Wang _cWenyu Wang
260			_aAmsterdam _bElsevier _cMay 2018
300			_aPages 320-343
440			_aJournal of Financial Economics _v128 (2) _x0304-405X
500			_aAbstract Because firms’ takeover motives are unobservable to investors, mergers are only partially anticipated and often appear as mixed blessings for acquirers. I construct and estimate a model to study the causes and consequences of bid anticipation and information revelation in mergers. Controlling for the market’s reassessment of the acquirer’s stand-alone value, I estimate that acquirers gain 4% from a typical merger. The total value of an active merger market averages 13% for acquirers, part of which is capitalized in their pre-merger market values. My model also explains the correlation between announcement returns and firm characteristics, as well as the low predictability of mergers.
690			_aMergers and acquisitions
690			_aRevelation
690			_aAnticipation
690			_aMerger gains
942			_2lcc _cSE
999			_c361355 _d361355