000			01350nam a22001817a 4500
008			190322b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a0304-405X
245			_aProtection of trade secrets and capital structure decisions / by Sandy Klasa, Hernán Ortiz-Molina, Matthew Serfling, Shweta Srinivasan _cSandy Klasa, Hernán Ortiz-Molina, Matthew Serfling, Shweta Srinivasan
260			_aAmsterdam _bElsevier _cMay 2018
300			_aPages 266-286
440			_a Journal of Financial Economic _v128 (2) _x0304-405X
500			_aAbstract Firms strategically choose more conservative capital structures when they face greater competitive threats stemming from the potential loss of their trade secrets to rivals. Following the recognition of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine by US state courts, which exogenously increases the protection of a firm's trade secrets by reducing the mobility of its workers who know its secrets to rivals, the firm increases its leverage relative to unaffected rivals. The effect is stronger for firms with a greater risk of losing key employees to rivals, for those facing financially stronger rivals, and for those in industries where competition is more intense.
690			_aCapital structure
690			_aTrade secrets
690			_aIntellectual property
690			_aCompetitive threats
942			_2lcc _cSE
999			_c361353 _d361353