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008			190312b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a0304-405X
245			_aAre institutional investors with multiple blockholdings effective monitors? / by Jun-Koo Kang, Juan Luo, Hyun Seung Na _cJun-Koo Kang, Juan Luo, Hyun Seung Na
260			_aAmsterdam _bElsevier _cJune 2018
300			_aPages 576-602
440			_aJournal of Financial Economics _v128 (3) _x0304-405X
520			_aAbstract We examine whether institutions’ monitoring effectiveness is related to the number of their blockholdings. We find that the number of blocks that a firm's large institutions hold is positively associated with forced chief executive officer (CEO) turnover-performance sensitivity, abnormal returns around forced CEO turnover announcements and 13D filings, and changes in firm value. These results are particularly evident when institutions have multiple blockholdings in the same industry, when they have activism experience, or when they have long-term blockholdings in their portfolio firms. Our results suggest that information advantages and governance experience obtained from multiple blockholdings are important channels through which institutions perform effective monitoring.
690			_aCorporate governance
690			_aInstitutional investors
690			_aMultiple blockholdings
690			_aMonitoring
690			_aExperience
942			_2lcc _cSE
999			_c361349 _d361349