000			01211nam a22001697a 4500
008			190312b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
245			_aManagerial myopia and the mortgage meltdown / by Adam C. Kolasinski, Nan Yang _cAdam C. Kolasinski, Nan Yang
260			_aAmsterdam _bElsevier _c June 2018
300			_aPages 466-485
440			_aJournal of Financial Economic _v128 (3) _x0304-405X
520			_aAbstract Prominent policy makers assert that managerial short-termism was at the root of the subprime crisis of 2007–2009. Prior scholarly research, however, largely rejects this assertion. Using a more comprehensive measure of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) incentives for short-termism, we uncover evidence that short-termism indeed played a role. Firms whose CEOs were contractually allowed to sell or exercise more of their stock and options holdings sooner had more subprime exposure, a higher probability of financial distress, and lower risk-adjusted stock returns during the crisis, as well as higher fines and settlements for subprime-related fraud.
690			_aFinancial crisis
690			_aSubprime mortgages
690			_aFinancial fraud
690			_aCEO incentives
942			_2lcc _cSE
999			_c361344 _d361344