<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?> <rss version="2.0" xmlns:opensearch="http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearch/1.1/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"> <channel> <title> <![CDATA[Southville International School and Colleges Search for 'se,phr:&quot;Journal of Financial Economics &quot;']]> </title> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link> https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-search.pl?q=ccl=se%2Cphr%3A%22Journal%20of%20Financial%20Economics%20%22&#38;sort_by=relevance&#38;format=rss </link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <atom:link rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-search.pl?q=ccl=se%2Cphr%3A%22Journal%20of%20Financial%20Economics%20%22&#38;sort_by=relevance&#38;format=rss" /> <description> <![CDATA[ Search results for 'se,phr:&quot;Journal of Financial Economics &quot;' at Southville International School and Colleges]]> </description> <opensearch:totalResults>58</opensearch:totalResults> <opensearch:startIndex>0</opensearch:startIndex> <opensearch:itemsPerPage>50</opensearch:itemsPerPage> <atom:link rel="search" type="application/opensearchdescription+xml" href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-search.pl?q=ccl=se%2Cphr%3A%22Journal%20of%20Financial%20Economics%20%22&#38;sort_by=relevance&#38;format=opensearchdescription" /> <opensearch:Query role="request" searchTerms="q%3Dccl%3Dse%252Cphr%253A%2522Journal%2520of%2520Financial%2520Economics%2520%2522" startPage="" /> <item> <title> In search of ideas : Technological innovation and executive pay / </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361260</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> By Frydman, Carola.<br /> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> pages 1-24 </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361260">Place hold on <em>In search of ideas : Technological innovation and executive pay /</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361260</guid> </item> <item> <title> Creditor rights and innovation: Evidence from patent collateral / </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361261</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> pages 25-47 </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361261">Place hold on <em>Creditor rights and innovation: Evidence from patent collateral /</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361261</guid> </item> <item> <title> Micro (structure) before macro? The predictive power of aggregate illiquidity for stock returns and economic activity </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361262</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> pages 48-73 </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361262">Place hold on <em>Micro (structure) before macro? The predictive power of aggregate illiquidity for stock returns and economic activity</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361262</guid> </item> <item> <title> Patent collateral investor commitment, and the market for venture lending </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361263</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> pages 74 - 94 </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361263">Place hold on <em>Patent collateral investor commitment, and the market for venture lending</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361263</guid> </item> <item> <title> Informative fund size, managerial skill, and investor rationality / </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361265</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> pages 114-134 </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361265">Place hold on <em>Informative fund size, managerial skill, and investor rationality / </em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361265</guid> </item> <item> <title> Do an insider's wealth and income matter in the decision to engage in insider trading? </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361266</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> By Kallunki, Jenni ; Kallunki, Juha-Pekka ; Nilson, Henrik ; Puhakka, Mikko .<br /> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> pages 135-165 </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361266">Place hold on <em>Do an insider's wealth and income matter in the decision to engage in insider trading?</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361266</guid> </item> <item> <title> Carry </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361285</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam ELSEVIER 2018 .<br /> pages 197-225 </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361285">Place hold on <em>Carry</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361285</guid> </item> <item> <title> Four centuries of return predictability / </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361287</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam ELSEVIER 2018 .<br /> Pages 248-263 </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361287">Place hold on <em>Four centuries of return predictability / </em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361287</guid> </item> <item> <title> Financial market frictions and diversification </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361331</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> pages 21-50 </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361331">Place hold on <em>Financial market frictions and diversification</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361331</guid> </item> <item> <title> Threat of entry and debt maturity: Evidence from airlines/ by Parise, Gianpaolo </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361332</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 226-247 , Abstract I explore the effect of the threat posed by low-cost competitors on debt structure in the airline industry. I use the route network expansion of low-cost airlines to identify routes where the probability of future entry increases dramatically. I find that when a large portion of their market is threatened, incumbents significantly increase debt maturity before entry occurs. Overall, the main findings suggest that airlines respond to entry threats trading off the benefits of short-term financing for lower rollover risk. The results are consistent with models in which firms set their optimal debt structure in the presence of costly rollover failure. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361332">Place hold on <em>Threat of entry and debt maturity: Evidence from airlines/ by Parise, Gianpaolo</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361332</guid> </item> <item> <title> Four centuries of return predictability / by Benjamin Golez &amp; Peter Koudijs </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361333</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 197-416 , Abstract We combine annual stock market data for the most important equity markets of the last four centuries: the Netherlands and UK (1629–1812), UK (1813–1870), and US (1871–2015). We show that dividend yields are stationary and consistently forecast returns. The documented predictability holds for annual and multi-annual horizons and works both in- and out-of-sample, providing strong evidence that expected returns in stock markets are time-varying. In part, this variation is related to the business cycle, with expected returns increasing in recessions. We also find that, except for the period after 1945, dividend yields predict dividend growth rates. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361333">Place hold on <em>Four centuries of return predictability / by Benjamin Golez &amp; Peter Koudijs</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361333</guid> </item> <item> <title> Liquidity risk and maturity management over the credit cycle / by Atif Mian &amp; João A.C. Santos </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361334</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 264-284 , Abstract We show that firm demand-side factors are strong drivers of procyclical refinancing behavior over the credit cycle using novel data from the Shared National Credit program. Firms are more likely to refinance early when credit conditions are good to keep the effective maturity of their loans long and hedge against having to refinance in tight credit conditions. High credit quality firms are better able to hedge, making their refinancing propensity more sensitive to credit cycles than less creditworthy firms. There is a strong relationship between refinancing a loan, and subsequent growth in capital expenditure, especially when a loan is refinanced early. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361334">Place hold on <em>Liquidity risk and maturity management over the credit cycle / by Atif Mian &amp; João A.C. Santos</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361334</guid> </item> <item> <title> Taxation and executive compensation: Evidence from stock options / by Andrew Bird </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361335</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 285-302 , Abstract Understanding the effects of taxes on executive compensation provides insight into the process determining this compensation and is a key input to top income tax rate policy. A 2010 tax reform in Canada, which greatly increased the effective tax rate on stock option compensation for a subset of firms, provides a natural experiment with which to address this issue. Difference-in-differences estimates suggest that this tax increase resulted in an immediate reduction in both stock option grants and the fraction of total compensation made up of stock options with limited, if any, substitution towards other components of compensation. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361335">Place hold on <em>Taxation and executive compensation: Evidence from stock options / by Andrew Bird </em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361335</guid> </item> <item> <title> Employee representation and financial leverage / by Chen Lin, Thomas Schmid, Yuhai Xuan </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361336</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 303-324 , Abstract We analyze how direct employee voice affects financial leverage. German law mandates that firms’ supervisory boards consist of an equal number of employees’ and owners’ representatives. This requirement, however, applies only to firms with more than two thousand domestic employees. We exploit this discontinuity and the law’s introduction in 1976 for identification and find that direct employee power increases financial leverage. This is explained by a supply side effect: as banks’ interests are similar to those of employees, higher employee power reduces agency conflicts with debt providers, leading to better financing conditions. These findings reveal a novel mechanism of direct employee influence. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361336">Place hold on <em>Employee representation and financial leverage / by Chen Lin, Thomas Schmid, Yuhai Xuan</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361336</guid> </item> <item> <title> Leverage constraints and asset prices: Insights from mutual fund risk taking / by Oliver Boguth, Mikhail Simutin </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361337</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 325-341 , Abstract Prior theory suggests that time variation in the degree to which leverage constraints bind affects the pricing kernel. We propose a measure for this leverage constraint tightness by inverting the argument that constrained investors tilt their portfolios to riskier assets. We show that the average market beta of actively managed mutual funds—intermediaries facing leverage restrictions—captures their desire for leverage and thus the tightness of constraints. Consistent with theory, it strongly predicts returns of the betting-against-beta portfolio, and is a priced risk factor in the cross-section of mutual funds and stocks. Funds with low exposure to the factor outperform high-exposure funds by 5% annually, and for stocks this difference reaches 7%. Our results show that the tightness of leverage constraints has important implications for asset prices. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361337">Place hold on <em>Leverage constraints and asset prices: Insights from mutual fund risk taking / by Oliver Boguth, Mikhail Simutin </em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361337</guid> </item> <item> <title> Belief-free price formation / by Johannes Hörner, Stefano Lovo, Tristan Tomala </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361338</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 342-365 , Abstract We analyze security price formation in a dynamic setting in which long-lived dealers repeatedly compete for the opportunity to trade with short-lived retail traders. We characterize equilibria in which dealers’ pricing strategies are optimal irrespective of the private information that each dealer may possess. Thus, our model’s predictions are robust to different specifications of the dealers’ information structure. These equilibria reconcile, in a unified and parsimonious framework, price dynamics that are reminiscent of well-known stylized facts: excess price volatility, price to trading flow correlation, stochastic volatility and inventory-related trading. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361338">Place hold on <em>Belief-free price formation / by Johannes Hörner, Stefano Lovo, Tristan Tomala</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361338</guid> </item> <item> <title> Determinants and consequences of information processing delay: Evidence from the Thomson Reuters Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System / by Ferhat Akbas, Stanimir Markov, Musa Subasi, Eric Weisbrod </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361339</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 366-388 , Abstract We present new evidence that highlights the role of information intermediaries in the distribution and processing of earnings estimates in capital markets. We find that the time taken to activate an analyst's earnings forecast in the Thomson Reuters Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System is related to measures of investor demand for timely information processing, processing difficulty, and limited attention. Furthermore, we find that forecast announcement returns are muted and post-announcement drift is magnified for forecasts with longer unexpected activation delay and that market inefficiency is concentrated in neglected stocks and potentially exploitable. Finally, analyzing intraday returns, we find that activations facilitate price discovery. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361339">Place hold on <em>Determinants and consequences of information processing delay: Evidence from the Thomson Reuters Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System / by Ferhat Akbas, Stanimir Markov, Musa Subasi, Eric Weisbrod </em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361339</guid> </item> <item> <title> The consequences of managerial indiscretions: Sex, lies, and firm value / by Brandon N. Cline, Ralph A. Walkling &amp; Adam S. Yore </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361340</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 389-415 , Abstract Personal managerial indiscretions are separate from a firm's business activities but provide information about the manager's integrity. Consequently, they could affect counterparties’ trust in the firm and the firm's value and operations. We find that companies of accused executives experience significant wealth deterioration, reduced operating margins, and lost business partners. Indiscretions are also associated with an increased probability of unrelated shareholder-initiated lawsuits, Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission investigations, and managed earnings. Further, chief executive officers and boards face labor market consequences, including forced turnover, pay cuts, and lower shareholder votes at re-election. Indiscretions occur more often at poorly governed firms where disciplinary turnover is less likely. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361340">Place hold on <em>The consequences of managerial indiscretions: Sex, lies, and firm value / by Brandon N. Cline, Ralph A. Walkling &amp; Adam S. Yore </em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361340</guid> </item> <item> <title> Time varying risk aversion / by Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, Luigi Zingales </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361341</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 403-421 , Abstract Exploiting portfolio data and repeated surveys of an Italian bank's clients, we test whether investors’ risk aversion increases following the 2008 crisis. We find that, after the crisis, both qualitative and quantitative measures of risk aversion increase substantially and that affected individuals divest more stock. We investigate four explanations: changes in wealth, expected income, perceived probabilities, and emotion-based changes of the utility function. Our data are inconsistent with the first two channels, while they suggest that fear is a potential mechanism underlying financial decisions, whether by increasing the curvature of the utility function or the salience of negative outcomes. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361341">Place hold on <em>Time varying risk aversion / by Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, Luigi Zingales</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361341</guid> </item> <item> <title> Cost of experimentation and the evolution of venture capital / by Michael Ewens, Ramana Nanda, Matthew Rhodes-Kropf </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361342</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 422-442 </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361342">Place hold on <em>Cost of experimentation and the evolution of venture capital / by Michael Ewens, Ramana Nanda, Matthew Rhodes-Kropf</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361342</guid> </item> <item> <title> Are stock-financed takeovers opportunistic? / by B. Espen Eckbo, Tanakorn Makaew, Karin S. Thorburn </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361343</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 443-465 </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361343">Place hold on <em>Are stock-financed takeovers opportunistic? / by B. Espen Eckbo, Tanakorn Makaew, Karin S. Thorburn</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361343</guid> </item> <item> <title> Cash flow duration and the term structure of equity returns / by Michael Weber </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361345</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 486-503 </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361345">Place hold on <em>Cash flow duration and the term structure of equity returns / by Michael Weber</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361345</guid> </item> <item> <title> Asset pricing with beliefs-dependent risk aversion and learning / by Tony Berrada, Jérôme Detemple, Marcel Rindisbacher </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361346</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 504-534 </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361346">Place hold on <em>Asset pricing with beliefs-dependent risk aversion and learning / by Tony Berrada, Jérôme Detemple, Marcel Rindisbacher</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361346</guid> </item> <item> <title> Playing favorites: Conflicts of interest in mutual fund management / by Diane Del Guercio, Egemen Genç, Hai Tran </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361347</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 535-557 </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361347">Place hold on <em>Playing favorites: Conflicts of interest in mutual fund management / by Diane Del Guercio, Egemen Genç, Hai Tran </em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361347</guid> </item> <item> <title> The unintended consequences of divestment / by Shaun William Davies, Edward Dickersin Van Wesep </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361348</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 558-575 </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361348">Place hold on <em>The unintended consequences of divestment / by Shaun William Davies, Edward Dickersin Van Wesep</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361348</guid> </item> <item> <title> Are institutional investors with multiple blockholdings effective monitors? / by Jun-Koo Kang, Juan Luo, Hyun Seung Na </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361349</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 576-602 </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361349">Place hold on <em>Are institutional investors with multiple blockholdings effective monitors? / by Jun-Koo Kang, Juan Luo, Hyun Seung Na </em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361349</guid> </item> <item> <title> An intertemporal CAPM with stochastic volatility / by John Y. Campbell, Stefano Giglio, Christopher Polk, Robert Turley </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361350</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 207-233 , Abstract This paper studies the pricing of volatility risk using the first-order conditions of a long-term equity investor who is content to hold the aggregate equity market instead of overweighting value stocks and other equity portfolios that are attractive to short-term investors. We show that a conservative long-term investor will avoid such overweights to hedge against two types of deterioration in investment opportunities: declining expected stock returns and increasing volatility. We present novel evidence that low-frequency movements in equity volatility, tied to the default spread, are priced in the cross section of stock returns. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361350">Place hold on <em>An intertemporal CAPM with stochastic volatility / by John Y. Campbell, Stefano Giglio, Christopher Polk, Robert Turley</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361350</guid> </item> <item> <title> Choosing factors / by Eugene F. Fama, &amp; Kenneth R. French </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361351</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 234-252 , Abstract Our goal is to develop insights about the maximum squared Sharpe ratio for model factors as a metric for ranking asset pricing models. We consider nested and non-nested models. The nested models are the capital asset pricing model, the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), the five-factor extension in Fama and French (2015), and a six-factor model that adds a momentum factor. The non-nested models examine three issues about factor choice in the six-factor model: (1) cash profitability versus operating profitability as the variable used to construct profitability factors, (2) long-short spread factors versus excess return factors, and (3) factors that use small or big stocks versus factors that use both. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361351">Place hold on <em>Choosing factors / by Eugene F. Fama, &amp; Kenneth R. French</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361351</guid> </item> <item> <title> High frequency trading and extreme price movements / by Jonathan Brogaard, Allen Carrion, Thibaut Moyaert, Ryan Riordan, ... Konstantin Sokolov </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361352</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 253-265 , Abstract Are endogenous liquidity providers (ELPs) reliable in times of market stress? We examine the activity of a common ELP type—high frequency traders (HFTs)—around extreme price movements (EPMs). We find that on average HFTs provide liquidity during EPMs by absorbing imbalances created by non-high frequency traders (nHFTs). Yet HFT liquidity provision is limited to EPMs in single stocks. When several stocks experience simultaneous EPMs, HFT liquidity demand dominates their supply. There is little evidence of HFTs causing EPMs. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361352">Place hold on <em>High frequency trading and extreme price movements / by Jonathan Brogaard, Allen Carrion, Thibaut Moyaert, Ryan Riordan, ... Konstantin Sokolov</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361352</guid> </item> <item> <title> Cash windfalls and acquisitions </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361354</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 287-319 , Abstract This article studies the effect of cash windfalls on the acquisition policy of companies. As identification, I use a German tax reform that permitted firms to sell their equity stakes tax free. Companies that could realize a cash windfall by selling equity stakes see an increase in the probability of acquiring another company by 14%. I find that these additional acquisitions destroy firm value. Following the tax reform, affected firms experience a decrease of 1.2 percentage points in acquisition announcement returns. These effects are stronger for larger cash windfalls. My findings are consistent with the free cash flow theory. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361354">Place hold on <em>Cash windfalls and acquisitions</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361354</guid> </item> <item> <title> Bid anticipation, information revelation, and merger gains / by Wenyu Wang </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361355</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 320-343 , Abstract Because firms’ takeover motives are unobservable to investors, mergers are only partially anticipated and often appear as mixed blessings for acquirers. I construct and estimate a model to study the causes and consequences of bid anticipation and information revelation in mergers. Controlling for the market’s reassessment of the acquirer’s stand-alone value, I estimate that acquirers gain 4% from a typical merger. The total value of an active merger market averages 13% for acquirers, part of which is capitalized in their pre-merger market values. My model also explains the correlation between announcement returns and firm characteristics, as well as the low predictability of mergers. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361355">Place hold on <em>Bid anticipation, information revelation, and merger gains / by Wenyu Wang</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361355</guid> </item> <item> <title> Interest rate volatility, the yield curve, and the macroeconomy / Scott Joslin, Yaniv Konchitchki </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361356</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 344-362 , Abstract This paper provides theory and evidence that a low-dimensional term structure model can simultaneously price bonds and related options. It shows that a component of volatility risk largely unrelated to the shape of the yield curve is a determinant of expected excess returns for holding long maturity bonds. It also finds evidence for this return relationship both in the model and directly in the data through regression analysis. The paper also identifies a link between corporate earnings performance and interest rate volatility, providing a channel driving interest rate volatility. The structure of risk in the model that gives rise to these features of volatility is distinct from that inherent in recent models with unspanned stochastic volatility. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361356">Place hold on <em>Interest rate volatility, the yield curve, and the macroeconomy / Scott Joslin, Yaniv Konchitchki</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361356</guid> </item> <item> <title> The effects of q and cash flow on investment in the presence of measurement error / by Andrew B. Abel </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361357</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 363-377 , Abstract I analyze investment, q, and cash flow in a tractable stochastic model in which marginal q and average q are identically equal. I introduce classical measurement error and derive closed-form expressions for the coefficients in regressions of investment on q and cash flow. The cash-flow coefficient is positive and larger for faster growing firms, yet there are no financial frictions in the model. I develop the concepts of bivariate attenuation and weight shifting to interpret the estimated coefficients on q and cash flow in the presence of measurement error. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361357">Place hold on <em>The effects of q and cash flow on investment in the presence of measurement error / by Andrew B. Abel </em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361357</guid> </item> <item> <title> CEO attributes, compensation, and firm value: Evidence from a structural estimation / by T. Beau Page </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361358</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 378-401 , Abstract I present and estimate a dynamic model of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and effort provision. I find that variation in CEO attributes explains the majority of variation in compensation (equity and total) but little of the variation in firm value. The primary drivers of cross-sectional compensation are risk aversion and influence on the board. Additionally, I estimate the magnitude of CEO agency issues. Removing CEO influence increases shareholder value in the typical firm by 1.74%, making CEOs risk neutral increases shareholder value by 16.12%, and removing all agency frictions increases shareholder value by 28.99%. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361358">Place hold on <em>CEO attributes, compensation, and firm value: Evidence from a structural estimation / by T. Beau Page </em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361358</guid> </item> <item> <title> Extrapolation and bubbles / by Nicholas Barberis, Robin Greenwood, Lawrence Jin, Andrei Shleifer </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361359</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 203-227 , Abstract We present an extrapolative model of bubbles. In the model, many investors form their demand for a risky asset by weighing two signals—an average of the asset’s past price changes and the asset’s degree of overvaluation—and “waver” over time in the relative weight they put on them. The model predicts that good news about fundamentals can trigger large price bubbles, that bubbles will be accompanied by high trading volume, and that volume increases with past asset returns. We present empirical evidence that bears on some of the model’s distinctive predictions. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361359">Place hold on <em>Extrapolation and bubbles / by Nicholas Barberis, Robin Greenwood, Lawrence Jin, Andrei Shleifer</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361359</guid> </item> <item> <title> Spillovers from good-news and other bankruptcies: Real effects and price responses / by Nina Baranchuk &amp; Michael J. Rebello </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361360</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 228-249 , Abstract We model debt restructurings that could endogenously end in bankruptcy, and study spillovers to competitors’ operating decisions, profits, restructuring outcomes and security prices. We show that while bankruptcy could cause the firm’s share price to drop, bankruptcy always signals good news about the firm. We identify the conditions under which a bankruptcy also signals good news about competitors. We demonstrate that when a firm’s bankruptcy costs are relatively small, bankruptcy raises its share price while lowering the prices of competitors’ shares and debt as well as boosting the probability that they will enter bankruptcy. When there is little information asymmetry about the firm’s prospects, or the information asymmetry is about industry prospects, bankruptcy raises competitors’ share and debt prices and lowers their probability of bankruptcy. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361360">Place hold on <em>Spillovers from good-news and other bankruptcies: Real effects and price responses / by Nina Baranchuk &amp; Michael J. Rebello </em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361360</guid> </item> <item> <title> Warehouse banking / by Jason Roderick Donaldson, Giorgia Piacentino &amp; Anjan Thakor </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361361</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> .<br /> Pages 250-267 , Abstract We develop a theory of banking that explains why banks started out as commodities warehouses. We show that warehouses become banks because their superior storage technology allows them to enforce the repayment of loans most effectively. Further, interbank markets emerge endogenously to support this enforcement mechanism. Even though warehouses store deposits of real goods, they make loans by writing new fake warehouse receipts, rather than by taking deposits out of storage. Our theory helps to explain how modern banks create funding liquidity and why they combine warehousing (custody and deposit-taking), lending, and private money creation within the same institutions. It also casts light on a number of contemporary regulatory policies. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361361">Place hold on <em>Warehouse banking / by Jason Roderick Donaldson, Giorgia Piacentino &amp; Anjan Thakor</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361361</guid> </item> <item> <title> Cyclical investment behavior across financial institutions / by Yannick Timmer </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361362</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 268-286 , Abstract This paper contrasts the investment behavior of different financial institutions in debt securities as a response to past returns. For identification, I use unique security-level data from the German Microdatabase Securities Holdings Statistics. Banks and investment funds respond in a procyclical manner to past security-specific holding period returns. In contrast, insurance companies and pension funds act countercyclically; they buy when returns have been negative and sell after high returns. The heterogeneous responses can be explained by differences in their balance sheet structure. I exploit within-sector variation in the financial constraint to show that tighter constraints are associated with relatively more procyclical investment behavior. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361362">Place hold on <em>Cyclical investment behavior across financial institutions / by Yannick Timmer</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361362</guid> </item> <item> <title> Financial intermediation in private equity: How well do funds of funds perform? / by Robert S. Harris, Tim Jenkinson, Steven N. Kaplan &amp; Ruediger Stucke </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361363</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 287-305 , Abstract This paper focuses on funds of funds (FOFs) as a form of financial intermediation in private equity (both buyout and venture capital). After accounting for fees, FOFs provide returns equal to or above public market indices for both buyout and venture capital. While FOFs focusing on buyouts outperform public markets, they underperform direct fund investment strategies in buyout. In contrast, the average performance of FOFs in venture capital is on a par with results from direct venture fund investing. This suggests that FOFs in venture capital (but not in buyouts) are able to identify and access superior performing funds. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361363">Place hold on <em>Financial intermediation in private equity: How well do funds of funds perform? / by Robert S. Harris, Tim Jenkinson, Steven N. Kaplan &amp; Ruediger Stucke</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361363</guid> </item> <item> <title> Capital gains taxation and the cost of capital: Evidence from unanticipated cross-border transfers of tax base / by Harry Huizinga, Johannes Voget &amp; Wolf Wagner </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361364</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 306-328 , Abstract In a cross-border takeover, the tax base associated with future capital gains is transferred from target shareholders to acquirer shareholders. Cross-country differences in capital gains tax rates enable us to estimate the discount in target valuation on account of future capital gains. We estimate that a 1 percentage point increase in the capital gains tax rate reduces the value of equity by around 0.3%, which suggests that the capital gains tax significantly raises firms’ cost of capital. Furthermore, we find that the implied capital gains tax burden is higher at times of high economic growth and low stock market valuation. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361364">Place hold on <em>Capital gains taxation and the cost of capital: Evidence from unanticipated cross-border transfers of tax base / by Harry Huizinga, Johannes Voget &amp; Wolf Wagner </em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361364</guid> </item> <item> <title> What makes the bonding stick? A natural experiment testing the legal bonding hypothesis / by Amir N. Licht, Christopher Poliquin, Jordan I. Siegel &amp; Xi Li </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361365</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 329-356 , Abstract We use a US Supreme Court case, Morrison v. National Australia Bank (2010), as a natural experiment to test the legal bonding hypothesis. By decreasing the potential liability of US-listed foreign firms, particularly due to class action lawsuits, Morrison arguably eroded their legal bonding to compliance with disclosure duties. Nevertheless, we find evidence of an increase or insignificant change in share values. Tests of longer-run effects of the legal event indicate that foreign firms’ disclosure quality and likelihood of facing enforcement actions remained stable, as did investors’ revealed preferences for trading on US markets. These results go against the legal bonding hypothesis but are consistent with reputational bonding and with market-based accounts of US cross-listing. Our results may contribute to ongoing debate about civil enforcement of securities laws through class actions. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361365">Place hold on <em>What makes the bonding stick? A natural experiment testing the legal bonding hypothesis / by Amir N. Licht, Christopher Poliquin, Jordan I. Siegel &amp; Xi Li</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361365</guid> </item> <item> <title> Non-myopic betas / by Semyon Malamud &amp; Grigory Vilkov </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361366</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 357-381 , Abstract An overlapping generations model with investors having heterogeneous investment horizons leads to a two-factor asset pricing model. The risk premiums are determined by the exposure to the market (myopic betas) and the future return on the efficient portfolio (non-myopic betas), which is identified nonparametrically from equilibrium. Non-myopic betas are priced in the cross-section of stocks, producing increasing and economically significant risk-return relation. In the model with funding constraints, low non-myopic beta stocks deliver higher risk-adjusted returns. Empirically, a betting against non-myopic beta portfolio generates superior performance relative to common factor models and is negatively correlated with the market betting against beta portfolio. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361366">Place hold on <em>Non-myopic betas / by Semyon Malamud &amp; Grigory Vilkov</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361366</guid> </item> <item> <title> Tax distortions and bond issue pricing / by Mattia Landoni </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361367</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 382-393 , Abstract Original issue premium (OIP) bonds are the norm in the US tax-exempt market but very rare in the taxable market. A tax subsidy helps explain this disparity. Unlike bonds issued at par or discount, the price of OIP bonds can fall and yet remain above par, providing secondary market buyers with more tax-exempt coupon and less taxable market discount gain. The subsidy for OIP bonds explains additional, previously undocumented empirical facts. In a calibration exercise, the subsidy’s expected cost to the U.S. Treasury is estimated at $1.7 billion per year. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361367">Place hold on <em>Tax distortions and bond issue pricing / by Mattia Landoni</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361367</guid> </item> <item> <title> Market intraday momentum / by Lei Gao, Yufeng Han, Sophia Zhengzi Li &amp; Guofu Zhou </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361368</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> .<br /> Pages 394-414 , Abstract Based on high frequency S &amp; P 500 exchange-traded fund (ETF) data from 1993–2013, we show an intraday momentum pattern: the first half-hour return on the market as measured from the previous day’s market close predicts the last half-hour return. This predictability, which is both statistically and economically significant, is stronger on more volatile days, on higher volume days, on recession days, and on major macroeconomic news release days. Intraday momentum also exists for ten other most actively traded domestic and international ETFs. Theoretically, the intraday momentum is consistent not only with Bogousslavsky’s (2016) model of infrequent portfolio rebalancing but also with a model of late-informed trading near the market close. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361368">Place hold on <em>Market intraday momentum / by Lei Gao, Yufeng Han, Sophia Zhengzi Li &amp; Guofu Zhou</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361368</guid> </item> <item> <title> Term Structures of Asset Prices and Returns </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361369</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> By David Backus, Nina Boyarchenko, &amp; Mikhail Chernov.<br /> elsevier 2018 .<br /> pages 1-23, July 2018 </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361369">Place hold on <em>Term Structures of Asset Prices and Returns </em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361369</guid> </item> <item> <title> When Saving is Gambling </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361370</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> By J. Anthony Cookson .<br /> elsevier 2018 .<br /> pages 24-45, July 2018 </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361370">Place hold on <em>When Saving is Gambling </em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361370</guid> </item> <item> <title> Size matters, if you control your junk / </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361381</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> By Clifford Asness, Andrea Frazzini, Ronen Israel, Tobias J. Maskowitz, &amp; Lasse H. Pederson.<br /> elsevier 2018 .<br /> pages 479-509, September 2018 </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361381">Place hold on <em>Size matters, if you control your junk /</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361381</guid> </item> <item> <title> Financing as a supply chain: The capital structure of banks and borrowers / </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361382</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> By Will Gornall &amp; Ilya A. Strebulaev.<br /> elsevier 2018 .<br /> pages 510-530, September 2018 </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361382">Place hold on <em>Financing as a supply chain: The capital structure of banks and borrowers / </em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361382</guid> </item> <item> <title> Does policy uncertainty affect mergers and acquisitions? / </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361383</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> By Alice Bonaime, Huseyin Gulen, &amp; Mihai Ion.<br /> elsevier 2018 .<br /> pages 531-558, September 2018 </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361383">Place hold on <em>Does policy uncertainty affect mergers and acquisitions? /</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361383</guid> </item> <item> <title> Private Equity Portfolio Company Fees / </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361384</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> By Ludovic Philappou, Christian Rouch, &amp; Marc Umber .<br /> elsevier 2018 .<br /> pages 559-585, September 2018 </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361384">Place hold on <em>Private Equity Portfolio Company Fees /</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361384</guid> </item> </channel> </rss>
