<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?> <rss version="2.0" xmlns:opensearch="http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearch/1.1/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"> <channel> <title> <![CDATA[Southville International School and Colleges Search for 'copydate:&quot;August 2018&quot;']]> </title> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link> https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-search.pl?q=ccl=copydate%3A%22August%202018%22&#38;sort_by=relevance&#38;format=rss </link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <atom:link rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-search.pl?q=ccl=copydate%3A%22August%202018%22&#38;sort_by=relevance&#38;format=rss" /> <description> <![CDATA[ Search results for 'copydate:&quot;August 2018&quot;' at Southville International School and Colleges]]> </description> <opensearch:totalResults>8</opensearch:totalResults> <opensearch:startIndex>0</opensearch:startIndex> <opensearch:itemsPerPage>50</opensearch:itemsPerPage> <atom:link rel="search" type="application/opensearchdescription+xml" href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-search.pl?q=ccl=copydate%3A%22August%202018%22&#38;sort_by=relevance&#38;format=opensearchdescription" /> <opensearch:Query role="request" searchTerms="q%3Dccl%3Dcopydate%253A%2522August%25202018%2522" startPage="" /> <item> <title> Extrapolation and bubbles / by Nicholas Barberis, Robin Greenwood, Lawrence Jin, Andrei Shleifer </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361359</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 203-227 , Abstract We present an extrapolative model of bubbles. In the model, many investors form their demand for a risky asset by weighing two signals—an average of the asset’s past price changes and the asset’s degree of overvaluation—and “waver” over time in the relative weight they put on them. The model predicts that good news about fundamentals can trigger large price bubbles, that bubbles will be accompanied by high trading volume, and that volume increases with past asset returns. We present empirical evidence that bears on some of the model’s distinctive predictions. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361359">Place hold on <em>Extrapolation and bubbles / by Nicholas Barberis, Robin Greenwood, Lawrence Jin, Andrei Shleifer</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361359</guid> </item> <item> <title> Spillovers from good-news and other bankruptcies: Real effects and price responses / by Nina Baranchuk &amp; Michael J. Rebello </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361360</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 228-249 , Abstract We model debt restructurings that could endogenously end in bankruptcy, and study spillovers to competitors’ operating decisions, profits, restructuring outcomes and security prices. We show that while bankruptcy could cause the firm’s share price to drop, bankruptcy always signals good news about the firm. We identify the conditions under which a bankruptcy also signals good news about competitors. We demonstrate that when a firm’s bankruptcy costs are relatively small, bankruptcy raises its share price while lowering the prices of competitors’ shares and debt as well as boosting the probability that they will enter bankruptcy. When there is little information asymmetry about the firm’s prospects, or the information asymmetry is about industry prospects, bankruptcy raises competitors’ share and debt prices and lowers their probability of bankruptcy. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361360">Place hold on <em>Spillovers from good-news and other bankruptcies: Real effects and price responses / by Nina Baranchuk &amp; Michael J. Rebello </em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361360</guid> </item> <item> <title> Cyclical investment behavior across financial institutions / by Yannick Timmer </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361362</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 268-286 , Abstract This paper contrasts the investment behavior of different financial institutions in debt securities as a response to past returns. For identification, I use unique security-level data from the German Microdatabase Securities Holdings Statistics. Banks and investment funds respond in a procyclical manner to past security-specific holding period returns. In contrast, insurance companies and pension funds act countercyclically; they buy when returns have been negative and sell after high returns. The heterogeneous responses can be explained by differences in their balance sheet structure. I exploit within-sector variation in the financial constraint to show that tighter constraints are associated with relatively more procyclical investment behavior. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361362">Place hold on <em>Cyclical investment behavior across financial institutions / by Yannick Timmer</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361362</guid> </item> <item> <title> Financial intermediation in private equity: How well do funds of funds perform? / by Robert S. Harris, Tim Jenkinson, Steven N. Kaplan &amp; Ruediger Stucke </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361363</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 287-305 , Abstract This paper focuses on funds of funds (FOFs) as a form of financial intermediation in private equity (both buyout and venture capital). After accounting for fees, FOFs provide returns equal to or above public market indices for both buyout and venture capital. While FOFs focusing on buyouts outperform public markets, they underperform direct fund investment strategies in buyout. In contrast, the average performance of FOFs in venture capital is on a par with results from direct venture fund investing. This suggests that FOFs in venture capital (but not in buyouts) are able to identify and access superior performing funds. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361363">Place hold on <em>Financial intermediation in private equity: How well do funds of funds perform? / by Robert S. Harris, Tim Jenkinson, Steven N. Kaplan &amp; Ruediger Stucke</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361363</guid> </item> <item> <title> Capital gains taxation and the cost of capital: Evidence from unanticipated cross-border transfers of tax base / by Harry Huizinga, Johannes Voget &amp; Wolf Wagner </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361364</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 306-328 , Abstract In a cross-border takeover, the tax base associated with future capital gains is transferred from target shareholders to acquirer shareholders. Cross-country differences in capital gains tax rates enable us to estimate the discount in target valuation on account of future capital gains. We estimate that a 1 percentage point increase in the capital gains tax rate reduces the value of equity by around 0.3%, which suggests that the capital gains tax significantly raises firms’ cost of capital. Furthermore, we find that the implied capital gains tax burden is higher at times of high economic growth and low stock market valuation. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361364">Place hold on <em>Capital gains taxation and the cost of capital: Evidence from unanticipated cross-border transfers of tax base / by Harry Huizinga, Johannes Voget &amp; Wolf Wagner </em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361364</guid> </item> <item> <title> What makes the bonding stick? A natural experiment testing the legal bonding hypothesis / by Amir N. Licht, Christopher Poliquin, Jordan I. Siegel &amp; Xi Li </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361365</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 329-356 , Abstract We use a US Supreme Court case, Morrison v. National Australia Bank (2010), as a natural experiment to test the legal bonding hypothesis. By decreasing the potential liability of US-listed foreign firms, particularly due to class action lawsuits, Morrison arguably eroded their legal bonding to compliance with disclosure duties. Nevertheless, we find evidence of an increase or insignificant change in share values. Tests of longer-run effects of the legal event indicate that foreign firms’ disclosure quality and likelihood of facing enforcement actions remained stable, as did investors’ revealed preferences for trading on US markets. These results go against the legal bonding hypothesis but are consistent with reputational bonding and with market-based accounts of US cross-listing. Our results may contribute to ongoing debate about civil enforcement of securities laws through class actions. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361365">Place hold on <em>What makes the bonding stick? A natural experiment testing the legal bonding hypothesis / by Amir N. Licht, Christopher Poliquin, Jordan I. Siegel &amp; Xi Li</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361365</guid> </item> <item> <title> Non-myopic betas / by Semyon Malamud &amp; Grigory Vilkov </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361366</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 357-381 , Abstract An overlapping generations model with investors having heterogeneous investment horizons leads to a two-factor asset pricing model. The risk premiums are determined by the exposure to the market (myopic betas) and the future return on the efficient portfolio (non-myopic betas), which is identified nonparametrically from equilibrium. Non-myopic betas are priced in the cross-section of stocks, producing increasing and economically significant risk-return relation. In the model with funding constraints, low non-myopic beta stocks deliver higher risk-adjusted returns. Empirically, a betting against non-myopic beta portfolio generates superior performance relative to common factor models and is negatively correlated with the market betting against beta portfolio. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361366">Place hold on <em>Non-myopic betas / by Semyon Malamud &amp; Grigory Vilkov</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361366</guid> </item> <item> <title> Tax distortions and bond issue pricing / by Mattia Landoni </title> <dc:identifier>ISBN:</dc:identifier> <!-- prettier-ignore-start --> <link>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361367</link> <!-- prettier-ignore-end --> <description> <![CDATA[ <p> Amsterdam Elsevier 2018 .<br /> Pages 382-393 , Abstract Original issue premium (OIP) bonds are the norm in the US tax-exempt market but very rare in the taxable market. A tax subsidy helps explain this disparity. Unlike bonds issued at par or discount, the price of OIP bonds can fall and yet remain above par, providing secondary market buyers with more tax-exempt coupon and less taxable market discount gain. The subsidy for OIP bonds explains additional, previously undocumented empirical facts. In a calibration exercise, the subsidy’s expected cost to the U.S. Treasury is estimated at $1.7 billion per year. </p> ]]> <![CDATA[ <p> <a href="https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-reserve.pl?biblionumber=361367">Place hold on <em>Tax distortions and bond issue pricing / by Mattia Landoni</em></a> </p> ]]> </description> <guid>https://librarytest.southville.edu.ph/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=361367</guid> </item> </channel> </rss>
